TITLE

Nuclear Capacity Auctions

AUTHOR(S)
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Tangeras, Thomas P.
PUB. DATE
July 2015
SOURCE
Energy Journal;Jul2015, Vol. 36 Issue 3, p247
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
We propose nuclear capacity auctions as a means to correcting the incentives for investing in nuclear power. In particular, capacity auctions open the market for large-scale entry by outside firms. Requiring licensees to sell a share of capacity as virtual power plant contracts increases auction efficiency by mitigating incumbent producers' incentive to bid for market power. A motivating example is Sweden's policy reversal to allow new nuclear power to replace old reactors.
ACCESSION #
103358830

 

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