TITLE

Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Audit Pricing

AUTHOR(S)
Yangyang Chen; Gul, Ferdinand A.; Veeraraghavan, Madhu; Zolotoy, Leon
PUB. DATE
November 2015
SOURCE
Accounting Review;Nov2015, Vol. 90 Issue 6, p2205
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risk-taking incentives in the fees they charge for their services.
ACCESSION #
110682917

 

Related Articles

  • The Impact Of Corporate Governance And The Sarbanes-Oxley Act On CEO Compensation. Nourayi, Mahmoud M.; Kalbers, Lawrence; Daroca, Frank P. // Journal of Applied Business Research;May/Jun2012, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p463 

    This paper examines the effects of corporate governance on CEO compensation in light of regulatory controls introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The influence of economic and corporate governance variables on incentive-based CEO compensation are considered, using cross-section...

  • Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold. Adhikari, Hari P.; Bulmash, Samuel B.; Krolikowski, Marcin W.; Sah, Nilesh B. // Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance;Aug2015, Vol. 57, p191 

    There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX...

  • The Case for Independent Counsel. Rugen, Michael // NACD Directorship;Feb/Mar2008, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p52 

    The article discusses the case for independent counsel. Among the trends noted as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) are the recognition of most directors and chief executive officers (CEO) of the value of an independent board, and the need for directors to seek more...

  • The use of restricted stock in CEO compensation and its impact in the pre- and post-SOX era. Weishen Wang; Minhua Yang // Journal of Finance & Accountancy;2013, Vol. 13, p1 

    The use of restricted stocks as a part of CEO compensation has increased. The value of the accumulated restricted stocks that a CEO holds is about three or four times larger than his/her base salary. We study the impact of these accumulated restricted stocks on firms before and after the...

  • A Tale of Two Clawbacks: The Compensation Consequences of Misstated Financials.  // Venulex Legal Summaries;2010 Q3, Special section p1 

    The article discusses what public companies need to know about how section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and Dodd-Frank 954 clawback provisions operate, both individually and together. It highlights the use of SOX 304 clawback against uncharged chief executive officers and chief...

  • Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Changes in the Composition of Boards: Have they impacted CEO Compensation? Coville, Timothy Gordon // Review of Business;Summer2013, Vol. 33 Issue 2, p55 

    The article reflects on a study which examined the effect on chief executive officers (CEO) Compensation packages on the publicly listed firm who adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and on those who were forced to adopt fully-independent committees and independent directors. The study reveals...

  • Regulation and the Composition of CEO Pay. Jarque, Arantxa; Gaines, Brian // Economic Quarterly (10697225);Fourth Quarter 2012, Vol. 98 Issue 4, p309 

    The article discusses an empirical analysis of the trends in the U.S. on the use of various compensation instruments, focusing on restricted stock grants and option grants of chief executive officer (CEO) salary. It considers two changes in the U.S. regulation of compensation practices. It...

  • Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Banerjee, Suman; Humphery-Jenner, Mark; Nanda, Vikram // Review of Financial Studies;Oct2015, Vol. 28 Issue 10, p2812 

    The literature posits that some CEO overconfidence benefits shareholders, though high levels may not. We argue that adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence. We use the concurrent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and...

  • Will Revealing More Be Enough? de Mesa Graziano, Cheryl // Financial Executive;Mar2006, Vol. 22 Issue 2, p32 

    The article focuses on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposal concerning disclosure of stock options, bonuses and executive compensation. It states that executive compensation was a factor in all recent (as of 2006) corporate scandals in the U.S. It mentions that the SEC...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics