TITLE

The Constitutionality of the SEC Pay to Play Rule: Why 206(4)-5 Survives the Deregulatory Trend in Campaign Finance

AUTHOR(S)
BELL, IVET A.
PUB. DATE
October 2015
SOURCE
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems;Fall2015, Vol. 49 Issue 1, p1
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Campaign finance law seeks a balance between two frequently competing interests -- protection of the individual's First Amendment right to political expression and prevention of the corrupting effects of money in politics. Recent campaign finance decisions from the Roberts Court have exhibited a markedly deregulatory approach, striking down a number of campaign contribution limits. In light of this, an SEC rule which limits the campaign contributions of investment advisers and their employees has been challenged. Rule 206(4)-5 is a prophylactic measure that seeks to prevent pay to play arrangements, in which investment advisers make campaign contributions to public officials in return for being selected for lucrative government contracts for the management of public funds. This Note argues that Rule 206(4)-5 should survive constitutional challenge, even under the most unfavorable existing Supreme Court decisions, because it counters direct quid pro quo corruption. Further, this Note contends that courts should look beyond traditional campaign finance analysis to recognize the SEC's unique, compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the markets and protecting the investments of public fund beneficiaries. The SEC's special anti-fraud interest and status as an independent agency call for deference to its choice of regulatory design in adopting Rule 206(4)-5.
ACCESSION #
111550587

 

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