TITLE

Overdetermination Underdetermined

AUTHOR(S)
Bernstein, Sara
PUB. DATE
February 2016
SOURCE
Erkenntnis;Feb2016, Vol. 81 Issue 1, p17
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
ACCESSION #
112453269

 

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