TITLE

Consciousness and Conceivability

AUTHOR(S)
Hunter, David A.
PUB. DATE
June 2003
SOURCE
Canadian Journal of Philosophy;Jun2003, Vol. 33 Issue 2, p285
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Interprets the thesis 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness,' by John Perry. Nature of conceivability of arguments; Qualitative aspects of conscious experiences; Concept of Antecedent Physicalism; Physicalist conception of qualia; Concept of epiphenomenalism; Interpretation of anti-physical arguments.
ACCESSION #
11294131

 

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