TITLE

Physicalism and Supervenience: A Case for a New Sense of Physical Duplication

AUTHOR(S)
Roche, Michael
PUB. DATE
August 2016
SOURCE
Erkenntnis;Aug2016, Vol. 81 Issue 4, p669
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Physicalism is the view, roughly, that everything is physical. This thesis is often characterized in terms of a particular supervenience thesis. Central to this thesis is the idea of physical duplication. I argue that the standard way of understanding physical duplication leads-along with other claims-to a sub-optimal (and perhaps surprising) consequence for the physicalist. I block this consequence by shifting to an alternative sense of physical duplication. I then argue that physicalism is best characterized by a supervenience thesis that employs both the new sense of physical duplication and a new class of possible worlds.
ACCESSION #
117124317

 

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