TITLE

Advice for Physicalists

AUTHOR(S)
Hawthorne, John
PUB. DATE
May 2002
SOURCE
Philosophical Studies;May2002, Vol. 109 Issue 1, p17
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
This paper engages with two compelling challenges to physicalism, each designed to show that the nature of experience is elusive from the standpoint of physical science. It is argued that the physicalist is ultimately well placed to meet both challenges.
ACCESSION #
16630681

 

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