Reductionisms and physicalisms

Spurrett, David
May 2006
South African Journal of Philosophy;2006, Vol. 25 Issue 2, p159
Academic Journal
Causal exclusion arguments, especially as championed by Kim, have recently made life uncomfortable for would-be non-reductive physicalists. Non-reductive physicalism was itself, in turn, partly a response to earlier arguments against reductionism. The philosophy of science, though, distinguishes more forms of reduction than philosophy of mind generally cares to. In this paper I review four major families of reductionist thesis, and give reasons for keeping them more carefully separate than usual.


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