Verification of Nuclear Arms Limitations: An Analysis

Scoville Jr., Herbert
October 1970
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;Oct1970, Vol. 26 Issue 8, p6
The article presents an analysis of nuclear arms control verification. In this report, the author focuses on the design of arms limitation agreement which would significantly limit strategic armaments and increase real security. According to the author, arms limitation, together with its means of verification, should be designed to avoid continual alarms that violations were occurring, and that fears of minor infractions of the agreement should not be allowed to become a source of major international incidents. This can be attain by proper phasing of the agreement as by the mechanics of the verification.


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