On Ensuring that Physicalism is Not a Dual Attribute Theory In Sheep�s Clothing

Jackson, Frank
October 2006
Philosophical Studies;Oct2006, Vol. 131 Issue 1, p227
Academic Journal
Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto.


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