TITLE

On characterizing the physical

AUTHOR(S)
Wilson, Jessica
PUB. DATE
October 2006
SOURCE
Philosophical Studies;Oct2006, Vol. 131 Issue 1, p61
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components,1 1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that 2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality). Here I will explore the extent to which appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (no fundamental mentality) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. I will motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components.
ACCESSION #
22530400

 

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