TITLE

A defence of the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts

AUTHOR(S)
Haukioja, Jussi
PUB. DATE
May 2008
SOURCE
Philosophical Studies;May2008, Vol. 139 Issue 1, p145
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism, thus blocking the zombie argument. Torin Alter has recently presented three arguments against the conditional analysis strategy. This paper defends the conditional analysis strategy against Alter�s objections.
ACCESSION #
31695086

 

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