TITLE

POLICEMAN OR PLAYER?

AUTHOR(S)
GAMBLE, BARRY
PUB. DATE
April 2009
SOURCE
Accountancy;Apr2009, Vol. 143 Issue 1388, p36
SOURCE TYPE
Trade Publication
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses the role of non-executive directors (NEDs) in business failures or business near-failures. The responsibilities borne by NEDs in ensuring good governance are examined. Topics of discussion include NEDs that are passive and ineffective in safeguarding shareholders' interests and examples of governance failure.
ACCESSION #
38034230

 

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