We are living in a material world (and I am a material girl)

Díaz-León, E.
September 2008
Teorema;2008, Vol. 27 Issue 3, p85
Academic Journal
In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternatives, showing how it can overcome certain problems, and defend it against several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterized in this way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived.


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