TITLE

Experiencing a Hard Problem?

AUTHOR(S)
Platchias, Dimitris
PUB. DATE
September 2008
SOURCE
Teorema;2008, Vol. 27 Issue 3, p115
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
According to some philosophers (e.g. Kim (2005), Chalmers (1996)), phenomenal consciousness (i.e. that there is for instance, something it is like for one to feel a sharp pain in one's finger) cannot be explained scientifically because explanation in this case needs to go beyond the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. The claim is that although such explanans can account for the so-called easy problems of consciousness (e.g. the difference between wakefulness and sleep or the integration of information by a cognitive system), they cannot fully account for phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken: phenomenal consciousness, the so-called hard problem of consciousness is no harder than the easy problems in that I argue, phenomenal consciousness too can be fully explained in terms of cognitive abilities and functions and is therefore amenable to scientific investigation.
ACCESSION #
45643432

 

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