TITLE

Boards of Directors: Adversaries or Advisors

AUTHOR(S)
Buchan, P. Bruce
PUB. DATE
December 1981
SOURCE
California Management Review;Winter81, Vol. 24 Issue 2, p31
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article examines the nature of the powers possessed by corporate boards of directors in the United States. The importance of such boards in the information system of a firm is noted. Legislation governing the appointment of directors is discussed, reasons for the presence of many chief executive officers on large boards are presented, and the possible benefits of the presence of special interest groups on a board are weighed. Comparisons are made to the more cooperative style of business management commonly practiced in Japan.
ACCESSION #
4761391

 

Related Articles

  • Co-opted Boards. Coles, Jeffrey L.; Daniel, Naveen D.; Naveen, Lalitha // Review of Financial Studies;Jun2014, Vol. 27 Issue 6, p1751 

    We develop two measures of board composition to investigate whether directors appointed by the CEO have allegiance to the CEO and decrease their monitoring. Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. As Co-option increases, board...

  • A new kind of captured board. MULÉ, ANN C.; ELSON, CHARLES M. // Directors & Boards;2014 First Quarter, Vol. 38 Issue 2, p27 

    The article presents the author's insights on the management knowledge-captured board. The authors' say that good-governance advocates have sought to destroy the management-captured board by emphasizing the vitality of board independence. They state that the independent board members may be de...

  • A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE ON HOW OUTSIDE DIRECTORS IMPACT STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING. CARPENTER, MASON A.; WESTPHAL, JAMES D. // Academy of Management Proceedings & Membership Directory;1999, pA1 

    Prior research has given little consideration to external determinants of knowledge and perspective that may affect directors' ability to contribute to the strategic decision making process. We introduce a framework on board involvement in which the potential for outside directors to contribute...

  • Effects of Litigation Risk on Board Oversight and CEO Incentive Pay. Laux, Volker // Management Science;Jun2010, Vol. 56 Issue 6, p938 

    Various commentators have praised the WorldCom and Enron settlements for holding outside directors personally liable, arguing that heightened director liability will induce greater board oversight. This paper shows that the connection between director liability and board behavior is more subtle,...

  • Board size and corporate performance: the missing role of board leadership structure. Elsayed, Khaled // Journal of Management & Governance;Aug2011, Vol. 15 Issue 3, p415 

    Different arguments have been introduced in the literature both for and against large and small board sizes. In this context, empirical evidence regarding the impact of board size on corporate performance is less conclusive, which means that further study is needed. Contrary to previous work, it...

  • Split of Top Jobs Being Considered By Wamu Board. Dobbs, Kevin // American Banker;5/21/2008, Vol. 173 Issue 98, p16 

    The article reports that the board of Washington Mutual Inc. was deliberating on a shareholder proposal calling for the company to force longtime chairman and chief executive officer Kerry Killinger to relinquish the chairman's role to someone not affiliated with the company. The proposal won...

  • Director Independence: A Focus on Board Tenure. Romanchek, Bob; Keckley, Jeff // NACD Directorship;Jan/Feb2014, Vol. 40 Issue 1, p75 

    The authors discuss the issue of associating corporate director independence with tenure. They explain that although there are no rules in the U.S. linking a director's independence with tenure, other countries have established rules associating independence with the length of time a director...

  • Inside vs. outside directors. Loewenstein, Victor H. // Corporate Board;Jul/Aug96, Vol. 17 Issue 99, p22 

    Compares the roles of inside directors, outside directors and chief executive officers (CEO). Inside directors' loyalty to CEOs; Common titles appointed to inside directors; Impact of a solid succession planning on Wall Street analysts; Advice to establish a new board after a merger.

  • BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION. Conyon, Martin J.; Peck, Simon I. // Academy of Management Journal;Apr98, Vol. 41 Issue 2, p146 

    Using panel data on large, publicly traded U.K. companies gathered between 1991 and 1994, the authors examined the role of board control and remuneration committees in determining management compensation. Board monitoring, measured in terms of the proportion of nonexecutive directors on a board...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics