Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization

Melnyk, Andrew
March 2010
Philosophical Studies;Mar2010, Vol. 148 Issue 1, p113
Academic Journal
This paper interprets and criticizes some of the views presented in Sydney Shoemaker’s book, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007), on the topic of how mental properties are realized by physical properties, given that, on his view, human persons are not even token-identical with human bodies.


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