TITLE

ARE CEOS REWARDED FOR LUCK? THE ONES WITHOUT PRINCIPALS ARE

AUTHOR(S)
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil
PUB. DATE
August 2001
SOURCE
Quarterly Journal of Economics;Aug2001, Vol. 116 Issue 3, p901
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The contracting view of CEO pay assumes that pay is used by shareholders to solve an agency problem. Simple models of the contracting view predict that pay should not be tied to luck, where luck is defined as observable shocks to performance beyond the CEO's control. Using several measures of luck, we find that CEO pay in fact responds as much to a lucky dollar as to a general dollar. A skimming model, where the CEO has captured the pay-setting process, is consistent with this fact. Because some complications to the contracting view could also generate pay for luck, we test for skimming directly by examining the effect of governance. Consistent with skimming, we find that better governed firms pay their CEO less for luck.
ACCESSION #
5015011

 

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics