TITLE

The Determinants of the Presence of Independent Directors in French Board Companies

AUTHOR(S)
Chouchene, Ibtissem
PUB. DATE
May 2010
SOURCE
International Journal of Business & Management;May2010, Vol. 5 Issue 5, p144
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the presence of independent directors on boards of directors. Based on the agency theory, we study the different factors influencing the nomination of independent directors. The tests were applied to a sample of 79 companies belonging to the SBF120 index from 1999 to 2001. Using an OLS data regression framework, the findings show that the ownership structure and the size of the company determine the independence of the board from the management. The results indicate that when the part of capital represented on the board and held by the coalition of control is low, the presence of independent directors is more important. Also, the presence of the independent directors is significantly and positively determined by the participation of institutional investors and the size of the firm. However we do not find evidence of the influence of the leadership structure and the leverage on the independence of the board.
ACCESSION #
51366569

 

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