TITLE

Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the 'Physical': Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of

AUTHOR(S)
Crook, Seth; Gillett, Carl
PUB. DATE
September 2001
SOURCE
Canadian Journal of Philosophy;Sep2001, Vol. 31 Issue 3, p333
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Examines the relationship among physics, materialism, metaphysics and the formulation of physicalism. Configuration of all philosophical issues and projects; Nature of physicalism attention; Metaphysical roots of physicalism.
ACCESSION #
5591665

 

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