TITLE

Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts

AUTHOR(S)
Fazekas, Peter
PUB. DATE
March 2011
SOURCE
Philosophia;Mar2011, Vol. 39 Issue 1, p21
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features together with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sensory representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usually taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representational features introduced in the present paper.
ACCESSION #
57721415

 

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