New Risks and Rewards

Lynn, David M.
February 2011
NACD Directorship;Feb/Mar2011, Vol. 37 Issue 1, p45
The article discusses risks and rewards facing members of the compensation committee in the U.S. They face an increased risk of losing their board seats as many companies now move to a majority voting standard for director elections. When it comes to matters of compensation, the author stresses the need for them to focus on making their own independent judgments based on the best available data and independent, unbiased advice. He suggests collaboration with independent advisors who can serve as a valuable source of unbiased advice.


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