Wilson, Jessica
January 2011
Monist;Jan2011, Vol. 94 Issue 1, p121
Academic Journal
The article discusses the non-reductive realization and its relation to the lower level entities including non-reductive physicalism which is nothing over and above physical entities. It mentions that the non-reductive physicalists (NRPists) aim at showing how dependent higher-level entities that are physically acceptable. It states that lower-level physically acceptable entities upon higher entities depend are also ontologically and causally autonomous from non-reduction.


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