TITLE

Philosophy of Mind: A Jain Perspective

AUTHOR(S)
Kachhara, Narayan Lal
PUB. DATE
March 2011
SOURCE
US-China Education Review;Mar2011, Vol. 8 Issue 3, p370
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
No abstract available.
ACCESSION #
60074072

 

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