Are (Some) Qualophiles Contradicting Themselves?

Campbell, Neil
April 2011
International Journal of the Humanities;2011, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p75
Academic Journal
I explore three qualia-based objections to physicalism (spectrum inversion, the knowledge argument, and the appeal to the possibility of zombies) and argue that certain versions of these arguments are deeply inconsistent. The problem I identify is that in their attempt to address certain verificationist concerns they take on contradictory assumptions about the causal efficacy of qualia. In each case the argument requires both that qualia are efficacious and that they are epiphenomenal. I show that the zombie-based argument is better able to respond to this objection but can only do so by appealing to some highly implausible possibilities.


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