TITLE

WHY OPERATIONS ASSESSMENTS FAIL

AUTHOR(S)
Schroden, Jonathan
PUB. DATE
September 2011
SOURCE
Naval War College Review;Autumn2011, Vol. 64 Issue 4, p89
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses military operations assessments, which measure progress toward objectives, particularly focusing on U.S. efforts in the Afghan War and the Iraq War. The author comments on what he sees as assessments' failures and provides several recommendations. He reflects on doctrinal deficiencies and theoretical utilities. Aspects explored include training for those who produce assessments and commanders' interest and expectations. The author discusses ways to improve assessment processes and products. The need for operations assessments in unconventional wars and counterinsurgencies is also considered.
ACCESSION #
66963007

 

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