Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Schneider, Susan
January 2012
Philosophical Studies;Jan2012, Vol. 157 Issue 1, p61
Academic Journal
I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.


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