TITLE

Independent chairmen not so popular in 2013

AUTHOR(S)
BURR, BARRY B.
PUB. DATE
May 2013
SOURCE
Pensions & Investments;5/27/2013, Vol. 41 Issue 11, p0003
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article looks at shareholder votes on various corporate governance issues, as of 2013. It discusses independent chairman proposals, or proposals requiring the chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman positions to be held by different people. Other topics include executive compensation and disclosure of corporate lobbying activities and political expenditures.
ACCESSION #
87910910

 

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