TITLE

Undefeated dualism

AUTHOR(S)
Bogardus, Tomas
PUB. DATE
September 2013
SOURCE
Philosophical Studies;Sep2013, Vol. 165 Issue 2, p445
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This 'striking' generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it.
ACCESSION #
89769562

 

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