TITLE

Regulation and the Composition of CEO Pay

AUTHOR(S)
Jarque, Arantxa; Gaines, Brian
PUB. DATE
October 2012
SOURCE
Economic Quarterly (10697225);Fourth Quarter 2012, Vol. 98 Issue 4, p309
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses an empirical analysis of the trends in the U.S. on the use of various compensation instruments, focusing on restricted stock grants and option grants of chief executive officer (CEO) salary. It considers two changes in the U.S. regulation of compensation practices. It mentions that both the passage of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and the changes in accounting standards removed some advantage of granting options against stock as part of CEOs' compensation.
ACCESSION #
90037646

 

Related Articles

  • The Impact Of Corporate Governance And The Sarbanes-Oxley Act On CEO Compensation. Nourayi, Mahmoud M.; Kalbers, Lawrence; Daroca, Frank P. // Journal of Applied Business Research;May/Jun2012, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p463 

    This paper examines the effects of corporate governance on CEO compensation in light of regulatory controls introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The influence of economic and corporate governance variables on incentive-based CEO compensation are considered, using cross-section...

  • Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold. Adhikari, Hari P.; Bulmash, Samuel B.; Krolikowski, Marcin W.; Sah, Nilesh B. // Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance;Aug2015, Vol. 57, p191 

    There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX...

  • The Case for Independent Counsel. Rugen, Michael // NACD Directorship;Feb/Mar2008, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p52 

    The article discusses the case for independent counsel. Among the trends noted as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) are the recognition of most directors and chief executive officers (CEO) of the value of an independent board, and the need for directors to seek more...

  • The use of restricted stock in CEO compensation and its impact in the pre- and post-SOX era. Weishen Wang; Minhua Yang // Journal of Finance & Accountancy;2013, Vol. 13, p1 

    The use of restricted stocks as a part of CEO compensation has increased. The value of the accumulated restricted stocks that a CEO holds is about three or four times larger than his/her base salary. We study the impact of these accumulated restricted stocks on firms before and after the...

  • A Tale of Two Clawbacks: The Compensation Consequences of Misstated Financials.  // Venulex Legal Summaries;2010 Q3, Special section p1 

    The article discusses what public companies need to know about how section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and Dodd-Frank 954 clawback provisions operate, both individually and together. It highlights the use of SOX 304 clawback against uncharged chief executive officers and chief...

  • Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Changes in the Composition of Boards: Have they impacted CEO Compensation? Coville, Timothy Gordon // Review of Business;Summer2013, Vol. 33 Issue 2, p55 

    The article reflects on a study which examined the effect on chief executive officers (CEO) Compensation packages on the publicly listed firm who adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and on those who were forced to adopt fully-independent committees and independent directors. The study reveals...

  • The Impact of Financial Reforms on Executive Compensation. Yahr, Michael A.; Rubenfield, Ronald R. // Proceedings of the Business, Society & Government Consortium of ;2012, p141 

    The article explores the effect of financial reforms, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform, on executive compensation in the U.S. It references the performance of General Motors Co. which received government bailout and...

  • CLAWBACK PROVISIONS, FIRM PERFORMANCE, AND RISK SHIFTING. Mariola, Eleni; Ryan, Huldah // Journal of Business & Accounting;Fall2013, Vol. 6 Issue 1, p81 

    The number of publicly-traded firms that have voluntarily adopted clawback provisions in executive compensation packages has grown significantly since 2005. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) gives the SEC the power to recover certain executive compensation on behalf of the issuer, if...

  • Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Audit Pricing. Yangyang Chen; Gul, Ferdinand A.; Veeraraghavan, Madhu; Zolotoy, Leon // Accounting Review;Nov2015, Vol. 90 Issue 6, p2205 

    Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics