The Ombudsman: Employee Ownership as a Mechanism to Enhance Corporate Governance and Moderate Executive Pay Levels

Jones, Derek C.
November 2013
Interfaces;Nov/Dec2013, Vol. 43 Issue 6, p599
Academic Journal
By drawing on information about firms, including the Mondragon cooperatives and major Japanese corporations, I provide evidence on ways in which employee ownership may improve corporate governance and moderate executive pay levels.


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