The Ombudsman: Is the Evidence Sufficient to Take Action on Executive Pay? Reply to Commentators

Armstrong, J. Scott; Jacquart, Philippe
November 2013
Interfaces;Nov/Dec2013, Vol. 43 Issue 6, p602
Academic Journal
The experimental evidence in this collection of papers is sufficient for organizations to take action--at least with respect to investigating or testing alternative pay schemes. Some organizations have already implemented a number of these procedures. The failure of an organization's directors to follow evidence-based procedures for executive pay might be used as a basis for legal action by shareholders when results are detrimental to a firm.


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