TITLE

Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence

AUTHOR(S)
Gillette, Ann B.; Noe, Thomas H.; Rebello, Michael J.
PUB. DATE
August 2000
SOURCE
Working Paper Series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta);Aug2000, Vol. 2000 Issue 10, p1
SOURCE TYPE
Working Paper
DOC. TYPE
Working Paper
ABSTRACT
Presents an experiment model of the governance of an institution. Dependence of the management of the institution on the information possessed by insiders; Multiagent mechanisms that impose penalties for conflicting recommendations; Implementation of the intuitionally preferred allocation in experimental treatments in which watchdog agents were included.
ACCESSION #
3679124

 

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